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Jones: Contribution Among Tortfeasors

CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
ERNEST M. JONES*

In many automobile accident cases the acts of more than one person combine to cause injury. In such cases the victim of any tort
that is thereby committed can treat the actors as jointly or severally
liable. Consequently the injured party may choose to follow one
of several courses of conduct relevant to this discussion. He may elect
to settle with one tortfeasor for the entire damage. He may elect
to sue one tortfeasor severally to judgment and satisfaction. Or he
may elect to sue both or all tortfeasors jointly but to obtain satisfaction from only one. In each of these instances the question then
arises, can the tortfeasor who satisfies the victim's claim obtain
contribution from other tortfeasors? It is commonly assumed by
members of The Florida Bar that he cannot because contribution
cannot be had between joint tortfeasors, even in negligence cases.
As we shall see, this assumption about the law of Florida is supported
only by dicta, although the common law did develop a general rule
denying contribution among joint tortfeasors. But assume the courts
of Florida will and do follow the dicta and deny contribution. The
question then arises, would the public interest be better served by
a rule allowing contribution among joint tortfeasors?l The purpose
of this article is to evaluate the Florida practice of denying contribution among joint tortfeasors in terms of certain policy standards
believed to be acceptable criteria of the public interest.
CRITERIA OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST

The individual and social costs arising from automobile accidents
in Florida are appalling. 2 Statutes and decisions that tend to prevent
OB.B.A. 1949, LL.B. 1949, University of Mississippi; Professor of Law, University of Florida.
'The approval by the Commissioners of Uniform State Laws of the 1955 Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act focussed attention on this issue. 9 U.L.A. 69
(Supp. 1956).
2The consequences in life, physical injury, and property damage of automobile
accidents in Florida are statistically portrayed in the following table from the
Florida Highway Patrol, Monthly Summary of Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents in
the State of Florida:

[175]
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these losses are certainly in the public interest. Promulgation of a
Model Traffic Ordinance by the Florida Legislature shows that the
Legislature has recognized the importance of trying to prevent automobile accidents. 3 One standard that will be used to evaluate the
merits of the contribution issue, therefore, will be the extent to
which contribution practices tend to prevent automobile accidents.
A major objective of the Financial Responsibility Law, which
virtually guarantees an insured defendant, was to assure accident victims at least a minimum compensation.4 As early as 1917 the Supreme
Court of Florida also indorsed the policy of adequate compensation
when it greatly broadened the scope of vicarious liability by adopting
the theory of dangerous instrumentality. 5 In deference to established
legislative and judicial policy, then, contribution will be evaluated
according to the extent such practices promote the goal of adequate
compensation of accident victims.

1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956

Total
Accidents
Reported

Killed

7,381
10,462
12,304
14,919
34,006
50,599
57,281
61,458
68,042
76,954
87,329

736
786
685
673
871
876
890
951
970
978
1205

Death Rate
10.4
9.8
7.6
7.3
8.7
7.9
7.3
7.2
7.0
6.3
7.1

Injuries

Property
Damage
Accidents

5,194
6,372
6,888
8,076
12,416
15,781
19,068
20,027
21,741
25,652
29,629

6,064
7,577
9,352
25,260
39,546
43,799
47,316
52,511
58,806
66,200

STAT. c. 186 (1957).
41d. §324.011, Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d 693, 701 (Fla. 1957) (dissenting opinion).
5Anderson v. Southern Cotton Oil Co., 73 Fla. 432, 74 So. 975 (1917), Southern
Cotton Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). See also May v. Palm
Beach Chem. Co., 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955) (automobile owner cannot defend a
suit by passenger-wife by invoking driver-husband's marital immunity). Several
recent decisions indicate a wavering of the Supreme Court's attitude toward
compensation for victims. Weber v. Porco, 100 So.2d 146 (Fla. 1958) (dangerous
instrumentality doctrine used to impute negligence of the driver to the owner
of the car to bar owner's action against third party); Brooks v. Owens, 97 So.2d
693 (Fla. 1957) (discovery under FLA. R. Civ. P. cannot be used to ascertain the
limits of defendant's liability insurance policy); Brailsford v. Campbell, 89 So.2d
241 (Fla. 1956) (claimant under Wrongful Death Act must comply with the Guest
Statute by proving gross negligence).
3FLA.
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An inevitable by-product of Florida's Financial Responsibility
Law, if not an avowed goal, is the allocation "of losses caused by
automobile accidents to agencies that can distribute them in accordance with principles of good loss distribution.6 Good loss distribution implies that losses will be allocated to those classes of defendants who can, via prices and premiums, pass the burden on to all
of society, or to the group most directly benefiting from the operation
of automobiles, the driving public. For several reasons allocation of
losses according to principles of good loss distribution is in the
public interest.7 If losses must be borne either by automobile owners
without insurance protection or accident victims unable to distribute
them, the burden often will be ruinous. On the other hand, if pursuant to good loss distribution losses are allocated to large self-insurers
and to defendants covered by insurance, a certain, calculable, and
reasonable cost only must be borne by a single defendant. In turn,
a large self-insurer to whom a loss is allocated can shift the burden
to the consumers of its product; while insurance companies indemnifying automobile owners can pass the burden to their policyholders.
Moreover, allocation of losses to large business units, insurance companies, governmental bodies, and the like may aid the cause of accident prevention because such groups can and often do sponsor programs to reduce accidents. A third standard with which to evaluate
contribution, then, is the extent to which such practice promotes good
loss distribution.
The conception that accident losses should fall on the party at
fault pervades tort law. In deference to this long standing policy
contribution practices will be evaluated in terms of traditional conceptions of fault." Emphasis, however, will be upon social rather
than moral fault; upon humanitarian rather than self-righteous impulses.
In summary, contribution practices will be evaluated in terms of
the following standards: (1) Does the practice help to prevent acciGThe Financial Responsibility Division of the State Treasurer's Office estimated
that in 1957 85% of the automobiles registered in Florida had liability or property insurance of at least the statutory minimum.
7See 2 HARPER and JAMES, TORTs c. 13 (1956).
sIn writing this article I have assumed the continuation of the present system
of dealing with Florida's automobile accident problem. In so doing I do not
intend to imply that the present system, based as it is on traditional concepts of
fault as the major criterion of the public interest, is the best or even a satisfactory
system.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1958

3

Florida Law Review, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [1958], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

dents; (2) does the practice promote adequate compensation of accident victims; (3) does the practice promote good loss distribution;
and (4) does the practice conform to prevalent conceptions of fault?
THE DOCTRINAL BASIS FOR DENYING CONTRIBUTION

The usual doctrinal justification for the unwillingness of courts
at common law to aid persons at fault in the transaction from which
the claim arose was the maxim, in pari delicto. Underlying the application of the in pari delicto doctrine were several considerations of
policy. Some courts felt it was morally reprehensible and beneath
the dignity of the court to aid a tortfeasor. Some courts may have
believed that denying aid to a tortfeasor would deter others from
similar misconduct as well as punish the wrongdoer. Other courts
argued that saving the time and effort of settling contribution claims
by joint tortfeasors would expedite suits for "honest" litigants.
THE FAULT BASIS

The moral code generating the feeling that it is wrong to aid a
merely negligent tortfeasor is not familiar to us and probably not
widely accepted by the general public. Indeed, some advocates of
contribution label this attitude "misplaced prudery." Tortfeasors
denied contribution are punished, it is true, but the price of the
punishment is that other tortfeasors are, in effect, rewarded for their
wrong by being held completely free from liability. Moreover, it can
be contended that the lack of a contribution rule produces results
offensive to our moral beliefs in that there is a tendency for one joint
tortfeasor to bribe injured parties to seek satisfaction from other
tortfeasors. To allow contribution will abolish this temptation to
bribe the victim. Furthermore, contend its advocates, contribution
9

"Certainly one who wilfully breaks a contract commits as great, if not a
greater wrong, than one who is merely negligent, yet the common law permits
contribution in the former case while denying it in the latter." N.Y. LAW REVISION COMnMI'N REP., RECOMMENDATIONS AND STUDIES 703

(1936). "Even

in

tort

actions contributory negligence is not always a defense, as where the defendant
was wilful or reckless, or where the last clear chance rule or a comparative negligence rule or other similar rule operates." RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION

§85 (1936).

"Moreover, the 'Wrongdoing' actor himself is less and less often the real defendant
in these days of ever widening vicarious liability and ever growing insurance."
2 HARPER and JAMES, TORTS §25.22 (1956).
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does not offend but promotes a more refined application of the fault
principle by allocating loss either on the basis of the degree of fault
attributable to each tortfeasor, or on an assumption of equal fault.
Opponents of contribution deny that in practice contribution will
produce a distribution of losses consistent with a refined conception
of fault. The average individual rarely, if ever, has to pay out of his
own pocket the claim of an automobile accident victim. Insurance
companies and large self-insurers whose liability is vicarious, and
thus not predicated on fault, pay the vast majority of accident claims.
Further, in practice the ultimate incidence of the loss is shifted by
insurance companies to their policy holders and by self-insurers to
the consumers of their product or the users of their services, as the
case may be.
Moral guilt is probably rare, in any event, in the typical automobile negligence case. If moral guilt is present traditional fault considerations can often find expression with the indemnity concept.
And whether moral guilt is present or not the usual practice is to
grant contribution on the basis of numerical equality. Under such
a practice contribution is not necessarily related to degree of fault.
Opponents of contribution reply to the claim that the lack of a
contribution rule encourages collusive behavior between tort victims
and tortfeasors, by noting that the incentive of victims and impecunious tortfeasors to make deals whereby the entire blame can be
thrown on other tortfeasors would still remain if contribution were
allowed.10 Advocates of contribution have also contended that plaintiff's whim or spite, or the "accident" of a successful levy often determines which tortfeasor must pay the victim's claim, if contribution is not allowed. Opponents reply that in practice victims almost
always proceed against financially responsible defendants, by design
and not by accident, whimsy or spite."
loAccording to the insurance industry improper collusion is not a serious problem where contribution is not allowed. James, Replication, 54 H~Av. L. REv. 1178,
1180, n.5 (1941).
llTnE UNIFORM CONTRmuTuoN AMONG ToRTFEAsoRs Acr §5 (1939) (hereinafter
cited as 1939 UNIFORM Acr) provided that a release of any tortfeasor would not
release him from liability for contribution unless the release provided for a reduction of plaintiff's claim for damages "to the extent of the pro rata share of
the released tortfeasor" to avoid the possibility that risk allocation would turn on
whim, spite or collusion. "Reports from the states where the Act is adopted appear
to agree that it has accomplished nothing in preventing collusion. In most threeparty cases two parties join hands against the third, and this occurs even when
the case goes to trial against both defendants. 'Gentlemen's agreements' are still
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If emphasis is laid upon social rather than moral fault, conceptions of fault can be mustered to oppose adoption of a contribution
rule. Ethical and humanitarian impulses are at the root of the conviction that the public interest will be served by legal practices that
tend to cause the victims of accidents to be adequately compensated,
and that tend to allocate the losses produced by accidents to agencies
that can distribute them to large groups of society. The desire to
compensate the victims of accidents by allocating losses to good loss
distributors is not motivated by envy ("soak the rich"), or by a desire
for vengence; but by the desire to alleviate the vast amount of human
suffering that will occur if public action is not taken, and by the
desire to allocate the losses occasioned by accidents in such a way as
not to cause ruinous consequences to those who must bear them.
Further, the feeling that it is fair to impose losses on defendants who
are merely conduits for distributing losses to large groups when it is
fair for the group as a whole to bear them, and the feeling that the
group that chiefly benefits from the activity producing the losses
ought to bear the burden of those losses are ethical considerations
stemming from a very fine humanitarianism. If contribution would
prove offensive to the policies of adequate compensation and efficient
loss distribution, the ethical and humanitarian impulses which support the policies of adequate compensation and good loss distribution
would be frustrated. From this viewpoint, of course, the fault of tortfeasors becomes less important and social needs assume a major role
in ethical evaluation.
THE DETERRENT ARGUMENT

The contention that denying contribution to joint tortfeasors will
deter others from similar tortious conduct has a powerful persuasive
appeal if it is assumed that a causal relation exists between the practice of denying contribution and the occurrence of automobile accidents in Florida. The weakness of the argument, however, is that
the existence of the causal relation is highly suspect.' 2 Very rarely has
made among lawyers, and the formal release is not at all essential to them. If the
plaintiff wishes to discriminate as to the defendants, the 1939 provision does not
prevent him from doing so." HANDBOOK OF TiE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CO.MM'RS ON
UNIFORM STATE LAWS 224 (1955) (hereinafter cited as HANDBOOK), commenting on
the UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §46 (1955)
(hereinafter
cited as 1955 UNIFORM ACT).
12Leflar turned the deterrence argument into a contention for contribution by
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a writer contended that withholding contribution would deter careless driving, 3 although occasionally a court will assert such a relation
exists when it invokes the in pari delicto doctrine. There is no evidence to support the assumption that a deterrent factor operates.
Analytically, it is doubtful that a field study would establish a causal
relationship. Most motorists probably would not know that a contribution rule existed if one were adopted. Even if motorists were aware
of a contribution rule, they do not usually directly contemplate
having an automobile accident and weigh the contribution risk. And
assuming that many motorists do directly contemplate the possibility
of an accident, the fear of death, serious physical injury and large
damage awards does not appear to make a significant contribution to
careful driving. How, then, can it be sensibly assumed that the imposition of the risk of being denied contribution would deter the
4
careless driver?'
ADMINISTRATION OF CONTRIBUTION

Opponents of contribution have asserted that neither a trial
judge nor a jury is capable of coping with the extremely difficult
problems of relative fault and apportionment of damages which a
contribution rule would create. The denial of contribution at common law, like the development of joint and several liability in tort,
enabled the courts to avoid the administrative burdens of determining relative fault and apportioning damages.
For several reasons the above contentions appear to me as inconclusive. First, Florida courts have had the experience of administering a comparative negligence statute which requires both an appraisal of relative fault and the apportionment of damages, and apparently have not concluded that the problems are insurmountable
or unreasonably difficult.15 We also know that juries often respond
to evidence of contributory negligence by reducing plaintiff's damage
arguing that the chance that a tortfeasor who does not have to respond to a contribution suit may go scot-free, may encourage wrongdoing. Leflar, Contribution and
Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. Rv. 130, 133 (1932).
13Gregory contended that the lack of a contribution rule would engender a
"sense of utter irresponsibility on the part of all people who wish to enjoy the
pleasures of risk-creating activity and at the same time eschew its responsibilities."
Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tortleasors: A Defense, 54 HARv. L. REy.
1170-71 (1941).
24Leflar, supra note 12, at 134.
IrTFLA. STAT. § §768.06, 769.03 (1957).
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award.16 Third, the application of the indemnity concept in joint
tortfeasor cases often involves a judgment as to the relative fault of
the parties. Of course, indemnity claims do not require an apportionment of damages. Finally, the problem of apportioning damages can
be avoided by basing contribution on the assumption that the parties
were equally at fault. To base contribution on an assumption of equal
fault, however, detracts from the contention that contribution allocates tort losses pursuant to a more refined conception of fault.
There is one aspect of the administration of a contribution rule
that has an important bearing on the advantages of contribution. If
adoption of a contribution rule includes a procedure allowing contribution in the injured party's action, adoption of a general comparative negligence statute may become undesirable because of the multiplicity of issues that would be raised.,, Of course, contribution
could be allowed only in separate suits.
THE EQUALITY ARGUMENT

The ideal of equality of treatment before the law has prompted
advocacy of a contribution rule. Conceptions of equality are closely
related to the concept of unjust enrichment. In contexts other than
joint tortfeasor cases contribution is freely allowed one of several coobligors who has discharged all or more than his proportionate part
of the common burden. In such cases the maxim "Equality is equity"
is often invoked to justify extension of relief. Similar considerations
can apply to joint tortfeasor cases.
The weakness of the equality before the law argument for contribution is its superficiality. It takes a vague idea of equality as a
major premise from which to deduce the conclusion that contribu-

tion is undesirable. Equality requires only that equals be treated
equal. Who are equals cannot be deduced from the premise of
equality. 18 Furthermore, the argument gives no consideration to the
social consequences of a contribution rule.
LGThe Chicago Jury Studies demonstrated this. Seasoned trial lawyers long suspected the truth. Kalven, How Jurors Think, U. Chi. Magazine, Nov. 5, 1955, p. 5.
17The prospect of cross-claims for contribution among multiple parties being
superimposed upon the issues a comparative negligence statute would raise led
James to conclude that "These things would lead . . . to an almost fantastic complexity." James, 8 VA. L. WEEKLY DIc:TA CoMP. 1 (1956).
1s"Hence a positive legal order may make any difference whatsoever between
human beings the basis of a different treatment of its subjects, without getting
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CONTRIBUTION AND COMPENSATION OF VICTIMS

As previously noted it is established legislative and judicial policy
to promote adequate compensation of automobile accident victims.
Would the adoption of a general rule allowing contribution among
joint tortfeasors frustrate or promote the goal of proper compensation?
James has made the most persuasive case that a contribution rule would
offend the policy of providing adequate compensation for accident
victims. 9
James argued that contribution would make it harder to settle
joint tortfeasor cases. Specifically, a joint tortfeasor will hesitate to
settle if contribution is allowed because he will reason that the inability of the injured party to protect him from contribution claims
20
by other tortfeasors makes settlement undesirable.
Adequate compensation for traffic accident victims requires prompt
payment to victims. The delays incident to litigation insure that
the damage award in litigated cases will not be forthcoming promptly.
Consequently it is desirable that the great majority of claims be
settled without litigation. Most estimates indicate that ninety per
cent or more of all claims are settled without resort to litigation and
that more than ninety per cent of all litigated claims are settled before judgment. In view of the usual victim's need for prompt payment, the present practice of a high percentage of settlements should
be encouraged and not deterred. 21
James contended further that contribution would offend the
policy of adequate compensation because victims could no longer
play tortfeasors off against each other with the threat of settling with
in conflict with the principle of equality, which is too empty to have practical
consequences." KELSEN, WHAT Is JusTicE? 15 (1957).
lojames, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54
HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1158 (1941); Book Review, 19 U. Cm. L. R-v. 158 (1936).
20The 1955 UNFORm ACr §4 (b), HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 223, provides that
a "good faith" settlement "discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given from all
liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor." A settling tortfeasor was not
protected against contribution under the 1939 UNIFORM Acr unless he could get the
injured party to accept a release expressly providing that the victim's damages
against other tortfeasors were reduced "to the extent of the pro rata share of the
released tortfeasor." 1939 UNrFORm Acr §5, 9 U.LA. 163 (1951).
2lThe inequality of bargaining power between victims and claims adjusters or
lawyers acting as claim adjusters will often impede adequate payment for settling.
Delay puts victims at even further disadvantage and works to reduce the sum paid
in settlement.
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one tortfeasor for only a small part of the total damage and proceeding against non-settling tortfeasors for the balance. Contribution would deprive the victim of this tactical advantage and reduce
the risk a non-settling tortfeasor would have to run. Separate settlements would become harder to secure and victims would have to
persuade the toughest tortfeasor in order to secure a settlement in
which all tortfeasors were released. Consequently, settlements would
be fewer, smaller, and longer delayed.
James' arguments cut deep. If in practice the existence of a
contribution rule in Florida would mean fewer, smaller and later
settlements, our policy of adequate compensation of automobile victims would suffer. But would these predictions bear out in practice?
It is not clear that these consequences necessarily would follow a
contribution rule. First, it is possible to have a contribution rule
under which a joint tortfeasor who made a good faith settlement
would be protected against contribution proceedings. Section 4 of
the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides for
22
such protection.
Moreover, assuming the enactment of a contribution rule under
which a settling tortfeasor would not be protected against contribution, it does not necessarily follow that tortfeasors would always, or
even usually, conclude that settlement is undesirable. If in a high
percentage of cases the injured person is without the counsel of an
experienced attorney or claims adjuster who knows both the value
of the claim and how to negotiate the most advantageous settlement,
a tortfeasor may be able to settle the claim for a small fraction of its
value in the hands of an experienced negotiator. The cheapness of
such a settlement could be enough to persuade a tortfeasor to run the
risk of later contribution proceedings. As James has noted 23 a tortfeasor could also react to a cheap settlement opportunity under contribution by bringing other tortfeasors into the settlement, thereby
eliminating the risk of a later contribution suit; or by delaying
settlement until the eve of the trial; or by not settling at all because
the availability of contribution would lessen the gamble involved.
The possibilities James mentions seem to me just as probable as the
possibility that a tortfeasor would react to an opportunity for a cheap
settlement by running the risk of contribution proceedings. However,
if tortfeasors react to an opportunity for a cheap settlement by settling
2

2See note 20 supra.
23Letter from Fleming James, Jr., to the author, Oct. 22, 1957.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss2/2

10

Jones: Contribution Among Tortfeasors
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS

only the claim against him, or by bringing in the other tortfeasors, 24
settlements will not be discouraged. It is true, however, that if his
reaction is to delay or to refuse settlement altogether, tort victims will
not be adequately compensated.2 5 The force of the contention that
settlements may not be deterred, even under a contribution rule which
does not protect a settling tortfeasor against contribution, depends
both on how often cheap releases are available and how often, despite the availability of a cheap release, tortfeasor would not settle.
There remains James' contention that contribution would deprive
the injured person of the tactical advantage of playing off one tortfeasor against the other by threatening to settle with one tortfeasor for
a small part of the total damage and holding non-settling tortfeasors
for the balance. This argument apparently assumes that the injured
person is represented by an experienced negotiator of personal injury settlements skilled in such tactics. In cases where victim is not
represented by an experienced negotiator and does not know either
of or how to use this bargaining technique its destruction as a result
of a contribution rule is not a serious loss.26 But in every case where
the injured party or his representative would use the advantage to
get a speedier, fairer settlement loss of the tactic would frustrate
the policy of insuring adequate compensation of automobile accident
victims.
Advocates of a contribution rule contend that its adoption would
not breed litigation. The above analysis indicates that settlements
would be deterred. As a consequence damage suits would increase.
Furthermore, the incentive for insurance companies and large selfinsurers to make voluntary arrangements to share the loss might be
decreased under contribution. As a result many suits for contribu241f tortfeasor reacts to a cheap release plus contribution risk by bringing other
tortfeasors into the settlement, settlement is promoted, not deterred. It may not
be an adequate settlement, but fairer settlements can hardly be promoted by withholding contribution.
25Tortfeasor could react to an opportunity to secure a cheap release by settling
all of the victim's damage claim. No doubt this would happen more often if the
settling tortfeasor could then have contribution from the other tortfeasors as
provided by the 1955 UNiFoRm Aer §I (d), HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 199, 218.
Here again settlements would be promoted by contribution.
26James reacted to an assertion that the use of this bargaining technique by

plaintiff to force settlement by one tortfeasor is "collusive" by replying: "This is
free use of vituperative word. To practical lawyers it seems perfectly legitimate
for the plaintiff to make what he can out of the no-contribution rule." James,
supra note 19, at 1161, n.13.
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tion would be brought. It seems to me, therefore, that the burden of
increased litigation must be counted a disadvantage of a contribution
rule.
In yet another way contribution may conflict with Florida's policy
of adequate compensation. In a given case any of a number of circumstances may exist which would cause the plaintiff to believe that it is
good tactics to sue only one joint tortfeasor.27 For example, if plaintiff is injured as a result of the concurrent negligence of A and B,
plaintiff may decide to sue B alone, because (1) A is not financially
responsible and plaintiff wants to avoid the risk that a jury would
hold A alone responsible; (2) plaintiff was a guest in a car driven
by A and plaintiff wants to avoid the risk that a jury would identify
"driver and passenger and impute the former's negligence" to the
latter;28 (3) plaintiff is "unwilling to prejudice the driver's own claims
by trying to prove that his negligence contributed to the accident";

(4) plaintiff is afraid of confusing the jury with a multiplicity of
issues; (5) plaintiff expects A to be a valuable witness in proving the
case against B; (6) plaintiff believes that his case against B is clearer
and that the amount of his judgment against B will be higher if only
the clearer case of negligence is presented; 29 (7) plaintiff prefers to
sue in the federal courts and joinder of all possible defendants would
destroy the necessary diversity or the desired venue.2 0 If a contribution rule is accompanied by a rule allowing a joint tortfeasor sued
alone to bring in other tortfeasors against whom plaintiff must take
judgment, he will be deprived of a tactical device which he might
otherwise employ to secure a more adequate damage award.8 ' Contri27"Where some of the defendants are insured and some are not, the plaintiff
may choose to sue only the insured, but if he does not do so, he may be sure
that these defendants will bring in the uninsured defendant wherever third party
practice permits, and will undertake to place the entire responsibility upon the
defendant. Generally speaking, it is part of wisdom for the plaintiff not to join
the uninsured driver if plaintiff thinks he will be brought in by other defendants.
His failure to sue him and the fact that another defendant brings him into the
case may lead the jury to believe that he is uninsured and irresponsible and therefore may influence the jury in returning a verdict against the insured defendants
alone, or against them and the uninsured defendant jointly and severally." Allen,
Evaluation and Settlement of a Personal Injury Claim for Damages, 14 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 1, 24-25 (1957). See also James, supra note 19, at 1162-64; Note, 68
HARV. L. REV. 697 (1955).
2

sJames, supra note 19, at 1162-64.
29Note, 68 HARV. L. REv. 697 (1955).
3O1bid.
31E.g., the 1939 UNIFORM Acr §7 (2) provided: "The plaintiff shall amend his
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bution can be allowed, of course, without provision for defendants to
implead other tortfeasorss2
CONTRIBUTION AND Loss DISTUBUTION

I believe that it is wise policy for Florida to seek to distribute
accident losses to good loss distributors. 33 Rules and practices which
enable victims to hold liable large self-insurers and insurance companies are socially desirable because these groups tend to be able
through prices and premiums to distribute the burden of legal liability
to the segment of society most directly benefiting from the use of the
product or service. As a result a small, perhaps negligible, cost to
individual members of a large group is substituted for what may be
a crushing burden on a single defendant. Would the adoption of a
general rule allowing contribution further good loss distribution?
Contribution may enable efficient loss distributors to allocate
part of the loss over to tortfeasors who cannot distribute it. James'
examination of eighty-nine cases listed under the fifth paragraph of
the title "Contribution" in the Fourth Decennial Digest led him to
conclude that contribution is usually sought in two classes of cases.
One, an efficient loss distributor (an insurance company or a large
self-insurer) sues another efficient loss distributor for contribution.
Two, an efficient loss distributor sues an inefficient loss distributor (an
uninsured individual, or an individual who cannot reallocate the
loss through the price of his product or services). He found no case
in which an uninsured individual sought contribution against a good
loss distributor. The first type of case does not justify a contribution
rule because, since litigants of this class are perennial defendants,
contribution claims cancel out in the long run, and because often
they voluntarily agree to share the burden of liability. The second
type of case definitely offends the principle of good loss distribution. Assuming efficient loss distributors will seldom sue financially
irresponsible tortfeasors for contribution, the evidence indicates they
pleadings to assert against the third-party defendant any claim which the plaintiff
might have asserted against the third-party defendant had he been joined originally
as a defendant." See Florida Fuel Oil v. Spring Villas, Inc., 95 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1957);
note 54 infra.
32The 1955 UNIFORM Acr does not provide for third party practice.
33E.g., Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine by holding the owner of
the automobile, although the owner was neither driving nor present, enables the
victim to hold a liability insurance company.
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will often pursue financially responsible uninsured individuals. The
absence of any cases of uninsured individuals seeking contribution
from good loss distributors suggests that contribution will rarely be
used to achieve good loss distribution. So, James concludes, contribution will rarely, if ever, be used to allocate loss from an inefficient
to an efficient loss distributor, but will often be used to allocate loss
from an efficient to an inefficient loss distributor. Little good can
result from allocating loss through contribution from one good loss
distributor to another because of voluntary contribution arrangements
and because contribution claims will equalize in the long run.
It seems at least theoretically possible that contribution
would promote good loss distribution in some cases, although I
have no idea how often such cases actually occur in Florida. Assume
P is injured as a result of the concurrent negligence of A and B, and
that both A and B are financially responsible individuals, although
not good loss distributors. If P sues A and B or A alone to judgment
and collects from A in full, the availability of contribution allowing
A to shift part of the loss to B would tend to promote the objectives of
good loss distribution. Because contribution would sometimes enable
A to avoid financial ruin; and it would always cause the loss to be
allocated over two instead of one tortfeasor3 4 Certainly, in the case
assumed good loss distribution is not offended. Florida's Financial
Responsibility Statute no doubt insures that the case supposed will
rarely occur 35 because either A or B or both will usually be insured
and thus good loss distributors, at least to the extent of policy coverage. But assume both A and B are fully insured and thus good loss
distributors, and assume that P collects full damages from A after
suing A and B to judgment. If contribution is available to A and
his insurance company is subrogated thereto whereby part of the loss
may be allocated to B, and his insurance policy covered a contribution
risk, two insurance companies and their policy holders share the loss
instead of one company and its policy holders. The policy of good
loss distribution is again promoted to the extent that the loss is distributed over a broader societal base, although withholding contribution would not entail financial ruin for A. James argues that contribution claims between insurance companies and large self-insurers will
cancel out in the long run and that at any rate these defendants often
enter into voluntary contribution agreements. But James found that
34The best loss distribution, of course, is over large groups of society as a

whole. Nevertheless, some distribution may occur among only two tortfeasors.
35See note 6 supra.
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in a substantial number of cases contribution was sought by an insurance company or large self-insurer against another such company.3 6
Apparently, then, voluntary contribution agreements alone cannot be
relied upon to secure contribution among these classes of defendants.
Contribution claims among perennial defendants may cancel out in
the long run, but the finding of a substantial number of suits among
such defendants by James suggests perennial defendants often doubt
the averaging process. It may be significant, however, that insurance
companies long opposed the enactment of the 1939 Uniform Contri7
bution Among Tortfeasors Act.
Another case in which contribution could result in better loss
distribution comes to mind. Suppose A is insured but B is not, although he is financially responsible. Because P is not represented by
an experienced negotiator, A is able to buy a release very cheaply,
persuading P to look to B for the balance of his damages. P then sues
B and recovers a judgment much more than twice the amount A paid
for his release. If B cannot allocate part of the loss to A by way of
contribution proceedings, most of the loss must be borne by one who
is not a good loss distributor. On the other hand, if contribution is
available to B better loss distribution will occur.38
A recent Pennsylvania decision3 9 has important implications for
the best loss distribution policy. In Fullerv. Fuller, a wife and minor
child suffered personal injury in a collision between a boxcar and a
car driven and owned by the husband. The railroad paid a judgment against it and proceeded against the company insuring joint
tortfeasor-husband for contribution. A clause in the insurance policy
excepting coverage of claims by members of the family of the insured
residing in his household was construed to exempt the carrier from
40
liability for the contribution claim.
36james examined 89 cases. In 46 cases a contribution rule would have allowed relief. To 9 of his inquiries there was no response, so that his conclusions
were based on 37 replies. In 23 of these 37 cases an insurance company or large
self-insurer sought contributions against an uninsured individual. James, supra note
19, at 1165-66.
37The Association of Casualty and Surety Companies no longer opposes the
1939 Act and does not oppose the 1955 Act. Letter from Robert N. Gilmore, Jr.,

Associate Counsel, to author, Nov. 6, 1957.

aSUnder some contribution statutes, e.g., 1955 UNIFORM Acr §4(b), if A's settlement was in "good faith" he would be discharged from liability for contribution
to B. If contribution is accompanied by such a rule, my argument will not apply.
3

9Fuller v. Fuller, 380 Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955), 60 Dica. L. RFv. 286 (1956).

4OThe policy contained the following provisions: "This policy does not apply
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The railroad company seeking contribution in the Fuller case
was a good loss distributor so that exempting joint tortfeasor's insurance carrier from liability for insured's contribution risk did not,
under the circumstances, seriously infringe the best loss distribution
policy. But suppose that a financially responsible individual (not a
good loss distributor) is substituted for the railroad company as joint
tortfeasor. If the insurance carrier is not liable for insured's contribution risk in this circumstance, the loss must fall on either the insured or his joint tortfeasor. In either event, good loss distribution
is not achieved because both are likely to be poor loss distributors.
Presumably, if the victims in the Fuller case had not been insured's wife and child residing in his household, the carrier would
have been liable for insured's contribution risk. Even so, cases coming
within the exclusion clause of the policy in the Fuller case must
occur very frequently. Consequently if Florida were to exempt insurance carriers from liability under such circumstances, much of the
force would be taken from the contention that contribution would
produce better loss distribution where a financially responsible tortfeasor could proceed against an insured tortfeasor. On the other
hand, since under Florida's Financial Responsibility Law about 90%
of all automobiles on Florida highways have at least minimum coverage, it is quite probable that financially responsible tortfeasors will
be good loss distributors too. Inability of insured tortfeasors to press
contribution claims against insurance carriers for other tortfeasors
would not greatly infringe the loss distribution policy, as we have
seen.
Another aspect of the Fuller case has a bearing upon loss distribution. A wife and minor daughter recovered against a railroad
company although the husband-parent, the driver of the car in which

... (d) under Coverage A, to bodily injury to or death of any employee of the
insured ... residing in the same household as the insured .... Coverage A - Bodily

Injury Liability. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become obligated to pay by reason of the liability imposed upon him by law for

damages . . . because of bodily injury . . .sustained by any person or persons,
caused by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the

automobile." A jury had found both the insured husband and the railroad liable
as joint tortfeasors to the wife and daughter. The court reasoned that to require
the insurance company to indemnify insured husband against the contribution
claim by the railroad would in effect make the policy applicable to liability imposed upon insured for damage for bodily injuries sustained by members of his
family residing in his household.
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they were riding, was concurrently negligent. This holding is possible
because husband-parent's negligence is not imputed to the wife and
minor daughter. But if the railroad company is allowed contribution
against the husband, the final incidence of half of the loss will rest
upon the family unit, unless the husband is insured by a policy
covering the contribution risk. If the husband is covered by insurance
against this risk, better loss distribution results. But if he is not, a
poor loss distributor must accept half the loss, the family relationship
which the marital and filial immunities are designed to protect, may
be imperiled, 4 and by indirection the negligence of the husband is
imputed to the wife and child to the extent of half their damages.42
These consequences can be avoided by refusing contribution against
a tortfeasor who would not have been liable to the victim because of
marital or filial immunity."
Advocates of contribution might also contend that subrogation of
insurance carriers to the contribution rights of insureds will be reflected in lower insurance rates which in turn will cause more insurance coverage. A wider insurance coverage will aid the cause of
44
adequate compensation as well as the cause of good loss distribution.
However, as James has noted, the insurance industry can experience
a net gain (or net reduction of operating expense) only to the extent
that subrogation to contribution claims exceeds expenditures to indemnify insureds against contribution claims.45 For this to be true
subrogation claims to contribution would have to come largely from
uninsured individuals. As a consequence, the net gain realized would
46
probably have negligible effects on rates.
4"But see Bohlen, Book Review, 45 YALE L.J. 1528, 1531 (1936), where the position is taken that allocating half the loss to the family group is unlikely to
create family dissension.
421 HARPFR and JAMEs, TORTS 717, n.14 (1956), commenting upon Di Benedictis
v. United States, 103 F. Supp. 462 (W.D. Pa. 1952).
43Most states have so held. Yellow Cab Co. v. Dreslin, 86 App. D.C. 327, 181 F.2d
626 (1950); Annot., 19 A.L.R.2d 1003-06 (1951). Lack of the "common liability"
prerequisite for contribution is the usual ground.
44The 1955 UNiFORM Acr §1 (e), HANDBOOK, supra note 11, at 220, subrogates
the liability insurance carrier. The Commissioners' comment on subsection (e) indicates that states allowing contribution have not agreed on the right of an insurance company to be subrogated to the right of contribution.
45James, supra note 19, at 1159, n.10.
4OThe opposition of the organized insurance industry to contribution suggests
that they made a similar analysis of their chances for a net gain. James, supra
note 10, at 1178, 1182.
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Several practices of the courts have a bearing on the merits of the
contribution issue. For one, there is a tendency for courts that have
denied themselves the right to use the contribution concept to invoke
the indemnity device, especially in some types of cases. Other courts
show a willingness to fit contribution claims with appealing features
within one of the several exceptions to the common law rule of no
contribution. Still other courts have shown a remarkable tolerance
of rather patent attempts to circumvent the rule against contribution.
Each of these practices will be examined for its implications for the
merits of contribution.
The Indemnity Approach
Many observers have reported the tendency of courts that have
adopted a no-contribution rule to invoke the indemnity concept when
persuaded that a plaintiff should not be left with the loss and a
plausible case for indemnity is presented. 47 The Illinois experience
47N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 28 (1952) (see also p. 37 where it is noted
that there is a large area in which there is no clear test as to whether contribution
or indemnity applies); Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors,
22 CORNELL L.Q. 469, 475-79, 483 (1937); Davis, Indemnity Between Negligent
Tortjeasors: A Proposed Rationale, 37 IOWA L. REV. 517 (1952); Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity Among Tortfeasors, 26 TEX. L. REV. 150 (1947); Meriam and
Thornton, Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 25 N.Y.U.L. REV. 845 (1950); 32 CIII.KENT L. REV. 298 (1954); 45 HARV. L. REV. 349 (1931); 19 U. Cm. L. REV. 388,
397-400 (1952); 4 VAND. L. REV. 907 (1951); 140 A.L.R. 1306 (1942); Bohlen, Book
Review, 45 YALE L.J. 1528, 1532 (1936). The tendency may in part represent confusion about the difference between contribution and indemnity. The annotation
in 140 A.L.R. 1306 (1942) and the language of Wheeler v. Slagle, 137 Tex. 341, 153
S.W.2d 449, 140 A.L.R. 1301 (1942), are prime examples. An early Florida decision
manifested the same confusion. Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932). Florida has since corrected the error.
Suwannee Valley Elec. Cooperative, Inc. v. Live Oak, P. & G.R.R., 73 So.2d 820
(Fla. 1954). Indemnity shifts all the loss. Contribution shifts only a part of the loss.
The distinction is neatly illustrated in Selz, Schwab & Co. v. Suthman, 62 Ill. App.
624 (1st Dist. 1896). Contrary to the assertion in 140 A.L.R. 1306 (1942) and in
the Seaboard Air Line case there was no general rule against indemnity at common
law. The English decision which ushered in the no contribution rule expressly
excepted one type of indemnity case. Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term Rep. 186,
101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799). "The decision [Merryweather v. Nixan] has been made
the basis of statements that with few exceptions there can be neither indemnity
nor contribution between tortfeasors. Such statements are not true with regard to
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as reflected by Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer
C0.48 is a good example of indemnity doing work that a contribution
rule could better perform. 49 An employee of a railroad company riding on a box car was crushed between defendants parked trailer and
the box car. The railroad company settled with the employee after
notifying defendant that it would look to defendant for full reimbursement. The trial court struck the railroad company's complaint
asking indemnity, apparently on the theory that the plaintiff was a
joint tortfeasor whose real claim was for contribution. On appeal
the complaint was construed to allege that the railroad was guilty of
only "passive technical" negligence while defendant was guilty of
"active and primary" negligence. Thus construed the complaint was
held to state a cause of action for indemnity.
The experience of Texas and New York in distinguishing proper
cases for indemnity from proper cases for contribution is also suggestive of how what might better be treated as a contribution case can
be brought within the indemnity concept. Texas has a statute allowing contribution between joint tortfeasors, provided that a common law cause of action for indemnity does not exist.50 Consequently
the Texas courts have been forced to distinguish indemnity from contribution. They have not been successful, however, in devising a
"test" for making the distinction. The resulting flexibility allows
the court to invoke either concept. 51 A similar freedom to classify
indemnity; there are many situations in which indemnity can be obtained, including those where the person seeking it was negligent in committing the tort."
RESTATENMNT, REsrrruTION §85 (1937). But it is true that American courts later used
Merryweather v. Nixan as authority for the proposition that there could be no contribution or indemnity among joint tortfeasors. The practical result is that an
indemnity claimant must fit his case into one of the several lines of exceptions to
the no indemnity among joint tortfeasors rule. The advocate should note, however,
that he will find more flexible exceptions to the no indemnity rule than to the
no-contribution rule.
48343 Ill. App. 148, 98 N.E.2d 783 (1st Dist. 1951).
49See the comments in 32 Cm.-KENT L. REv. 298 (1954); 19 U. CEH. L. REV. 388

(1952).
50TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2212 (1925).
5aCompare Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Martin, 148 Tex. 175, 222 S.W.2d 995
(1949), with Wheeler v. Slazer, 137 Tex. 341, 152 S.W.2d 449, 140 A.L.R. 1301,
(1942). The Wheeler case justified a decision that indemnity and not contribution
was available by invoking the theory that if one of two joint tortfeasors has
breached a duty owed by it to the other tortfeasor, the latter, if blameless, may
have indemnity from the former. Hodges proposed the theory of the Wheeler case
as a general test for determining whether indemnity should be awarded. Hodges,
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with an eye toward result is available to the Florida courts.
The New York statute allowing contribution makes a joint judgment against the tortfeasors a condition precedent to the contribution award.52 New York also has a third party practice statute,5 3 very
similar to Rule 14 (a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.- The
New York Court of Appeals early construed these two statutes not
to allow a joint tortfeasor sued alone to implead other joint tortfeasors for the purpose of contribution. 55 On the other hand a joint
tortfeasor sued alone can implead if he can show a case of indemnity.5 6
The consequence has been a rash of New York cases deciding on the
pleadings that an attempt by a joint tortfeasor sued alone to implead
supra note 47, at 151, 162. The history of the litigation in the Humble Oil case,
supra, challenges the usefulness of the test. See Davis, supra note 47, at 545-46. Cf.
Annot., 140 A.L.R. 1306 (1942). Other writers have proposed "unitary principles"
to explain and justify the award of indemnity. Davis, supra at 547, proposed the
"disproportionate duties" test under which "indemnity should be allowed against
the one who breached the less exacting duty," and purported to distinguish his
test from a judicial test of "great difference in fault of the two tortfeasors." Leflar,
supra note 12, at 148, proposed essentially the same test as Hodges; did indemnitor
commit a tort against indemnitee, distinct and independent from any tort committed by indemnitor and indemnitee against the injured third party? Bohlen,
supra note 47, at 478, argued that "justifiable reliance is . .. the soundest ground
upon which the right to indemnity can be placed." That is if indemnitee
justifiably relied on the assumption that indemnitor would not commit
a tort against the injured person, indemnitee can have indemnity against
indemnitor. See also 19 U. CI. L. REV. 388-401 (1952). Greater "control" of the
situation by the indemnitor has also been cited as a rationale for indemnity. 45
HARV. L. REV. 349, 352 (1931). I do not believe these so-called tests fully explain
or adequately justify indemnity awards. As explanations they are patently incomplete descriptions of the multitude of factors influencing the outcome of indemnity litigation. As justifications for the decisions in indemnity cases, they give
insufficient recognition to the issues of policy involved. Compare the orientation
to policy of Meriam and Thornton, supra note 47, at 862. The point of referring
to so-called tests for indemnity at this stage, however, is to show how flexible the
indemnity concept can be in the hands of a court with convictions about the
merits of the case before it and chafing at the restraints of the no-contribution rule.
52N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr. §211-a.
531d. §193-a.
S4Compare FLA. R. Civ. P. 1.13 (8); Florida Fuel Oil v. Spring Villas, Inc., 95
So.2d 581 (Fla. 1957); Pan American Surety Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 99 So.2d
726 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
55Fox v. Western N.Y. Motor Lines, Inc., 257 N.Y. 305, 178 N.E. 289 (1931). As
a result, contribution in New York turns on the injured person's election to join
the tortfeasors or sue them separately.
6SN.Y. LAw REVISION COMM'N REP.38-39 (1952).
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other joint tortfeasors will stand or fall depending on the court's
classification of the defendant's claim in his third party complaint as
one for contribution or indemnity. 57 Very "slight differences in the
duty owed or the culpability of persons failing to perform that duty"
have supplied the basis for an allowance of indemnity on the theory
that the third party plaintiff was guilty of only "passive" negligence
while the third party defendant was guilty of "active" negligence. 5
While it does not follow that the New York courts would have
been as willing to label a claim as one for indemnity if New York
had not had a contribution rule, the practice illustrates a technique
with which a court limited by a no contribution rule can shift all
the loss to another tortfeasor, although the court would rather have
the tortfeasors share the loss. Actually, the cases have tended to define categories of fact which justify an allowance of indemnification
not based on a contract. Some of these categories of fact appear to
leave little freedom to award relief in the name of indemnity although the court would prefer to allow contribution. The claim of
a master for indemnification from a servant whose tort caused the
master to become vicariously liable to a third party is an example.
Since the master is blameless his entire loss is allocated to the wrongdoing servant, and no question of contribution is raised. 59
Categories of fact have been defined, however, in which a wrongdoing tortfeasor is allowed indemnification against another tortfeasor.60 The cases involving wrongdoing tortfeasors in which courts
have invoked language such as "active-passive," or "last clear chance"
as justifications for awarding indemnity are the cases most apt to be
used to circumvent a no contribution rule in the automobile accident
context. To extend relief the courts need only to label the negligence of the indemnitee as "passive," or find that indemnitor had
61
the "last clear chance."'
671d. at 28.
5Slbid.
59These observations hold for all indemnity claims by one vicariously liable
for the tort of his indemnitor, as principal against agent, hired against independent
contractor and automobile owner against driver. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §96

(1937). For a general survey of situations where indemnity between tortfeasors is
allowed see id. §§89-98.
6OThe courts openly compare the fault of the litigants in these cases. The
inconvenience of apportioning damages is avoided, however, because indemnity
allows
the entire loss to be shifted.
6
'Other word formulas for allowing indemnity exist, of course. Cohen v. Noel,
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The characterization of the negligence of joint tortfeasors as
"active-passive" is probably the most flexible technique for awarding
indemnity because the words do not refer to any definite factual
criteria. By a careful choice of words to describe the conduct of the
tortfeasors the advocate for either party can invoke the classification
scheme to justify his claim. A garage owner has dim lights in his
garage. A patron drives a car into a ladder in the garage. Was
garage owner's negligence "active," in that he had dim lights; or was
it "passive," in that he failed to have bright lights? Was the driver
guilty of "active" negligence in driving carelessly or "passive" negligence in failing to drive carefully?62 The terms are not made more
precise by relating them to the "misfeasance-nonfeasance" or the
"omission-commission" dichotomies, 63 nor by reference to motion or
64
lack of motion on the part of the actors.
The leading case using the last clear chance doctrine as a technique for awarding indemnity is Nashua Iron & Steel Co. v. Worcester
and Nashua R.R.65 Although occuring before the automobile and its
165 Tenn. 600, 56 S.W.2d 744 (1933) ("primary cause" -"secondary
cause");
Chicago Ry. v. Conway Co., 219 Ill. App. 220 (1920) (indemnitee's act merely
"malum prohibitum"). Davis, supra note 47, at 543-44, lists a number of "catch
words." Florida employed the "not in pari delicto" formula in Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932).
Leflar, supra note 12, at 156, observed of the "not in pari delicto" formula: "[ilt
cannot possibly serve and never has served as a complete and accurate measure
for the right to indemnity between tortfeasors in the cases as they arise. It is used
to support decisions already arrived at. More or less substantial differences in
degrees of fault could be discovered between tortfeasors in a great many joint
liability cases in which the law has never suggested any grant of indemnity to
the one least at fault." Another technique for justifying an indemnity award is
to deny that indemnitor and indemnitee were "joint" tortfeasors for the purpose
of the no indemnity among joint tortfeasors rule, although they are "joint" for
the purpose of joinder of causes of action. Purple Swan Safety Coach Co. v.
Egyptian Trans. Co., 256 111. App. 442 (1930); Des Moines v. Barnes, 238 Iowa 1192,
30 N.W.2d 170 (1947); N.Y. LAw REvISION COMM'N REP. 713-14 (1936). Successive
injuries are not necessarily joint. HARPER and JAMES, TORTS 1124 (1956); PROSSER,
TORTS 230 (1955). Indemnity can be awarded in the name of subrogation. Clark
v. Halstead, 276 App. Div. 17, 93 N.Y.S.2d 49 (3d Dep't 1949).
62The Tennessee court classified the garage owner's negligence as "active" and
that of the driver as "passive" and awarded indemnity to the latter. Cohen v. Neal,
165 Tenn. 600, 56 S.W.2d 744 (1933). See Davis, supra note 47, at 539-43.
63Meriam and Thornton, supra note 47, at 859.
64Gulf, M. & 0. R.R. v. Arthur Dixon Transfer Co., 343 Ill. App. 148, 157, 98
N.E.2d 788, 788 (1951).
6562 N.H. 159 (1882).
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attendant social problems made its appearance, the facts of the Nashua
decision supply an easy analogy to the facts of many automobile accident cases. Plaintiff in Nashua alleged that defendant's negligence
frightened plaintiff's horse and caused it to run over and injure one
Clapp. Clapp sued plaintiff, recovered judgment and obtained satisfaction. Plaintiff therefore asked indemnity. In overruling defendant's
demurrer, the appellate court assumed that plaintiff's negligent mismanagement of the horse caused him to be liable to Glapp but stated
that if after plaintiff's negligence, defendant could have avoided
frightening the horse and injuring Glapp while plaintiff could not,
plaintiff was entitled to indemnity.
Plaintiff thus got the benefit of the last clear chance rule. The
technical requirements of last clear chance as a justification for indemnity seem to be the same as in the ordinary negligence case defended on the basis of contributory negligence. If these are met
plaintiff's negligence does not bar his claim for indemnity.66
66The last clear chance justification of indemnity in joint tortfeasor cases found
expression in REsrATEMENT, RrsrrrUTON

§97 (1937), although it is made more

restrictive by the requirement that the tortfeasor having the last clear chance must
have engaged in "reckless or intentionally wrongful conduct." The reporter's notes
admit, however, that the cases are not so conservative. Id., Explanatory Notes 162.
The following cases have used last clear chance to avoid indemnity: Colorado &
Sou. Ry. v. Western Light Power Co., 73 Colo. 107, 214 Pac. 30 (1923); Colonial
Motor Coach Corp. v. New York Cent. R.R., 131 Misc. 891, 228 N.Y. Supp. 508
(1928); Knippenberg v. Lord & Taylor, 193 App. Div. 753, 184 N.Y. Supp. 785 (1st
Dep't 1920); Austin Elec. Ry. v. Faust, 63 Tex. Civ. App. 91, 133 S.W. 449 (1911).
Compare Kimbriel Produce Co. v. Mayo, 180 S.W.2d 504 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944),
error refused; Hodges, supra note 47, at 163-65. Leflar, supra note 12, at 152, could
find no reason of policy for refusing to apply the last clear chance doctrine to
indemnify claims. Technical grounds for using last clear chance in this context
are: (1) Plaintiff seeking indemnity was not negligent as to a defendant who had a
last clear chance to avoid the accident, even if plaintiff was negligent as to injured
third party; (2) as between plaintiff and defendant the negligence of defendant
who had the last clear chance is to be regarded as the sole cause of the accident.
As Bohlen noted, however, use of last clear chance to justify indemnity is inconsistent with two classes of cases commonly allowing indemnity. A master supplied
with a dangerously defective tool which he turns over to an employee to use has
the last clear chance to avoid, by making a proper inspection, injury to the employee. Nevertheless, the master is allowed indemnity from the manufacturer or
supplier. A municipality may have the last clear chance of avoiding injury to third
persons as a result of dangerous defects in a highway caused by a defendant in
indemnity. Yet, in such cases the municipality has been allowed indemnity against
one causing the defect. The active-passive approach is commonly used in these two
classes of cases. It should not be assumed, however, that different results always
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What significance does the practice of using indemnity to do the
work of contribution have for the question of whether Florida needs
a contribution statute? I cannot supply a reliable answer.
The practice has been cited as a reason why a contribution rule
is not needed. The leading opponent of contribution, James, cited
cases employing indemnity this way, to support his argument that
contribution would not improve justice even on the fault principle.
James argued that the fault principle could be given sufficient recognition with the indemnity doctrine because "cases where the fault
of tortfeasors is grossly disproportionate are apt to fall within existing
' ' 67
rules which give one of them a right of indemnity against another.
On the other hand, the practice of using indemnity to do the work
of contribution can be cited as a reason for a contribution rule. The
existence of the practice suggests an over-indulgence of the urge to
invoke conceptions of fault. Under the practice the relative fault of
the parties is compared and indemnification extended to the party
less at fault against the party most at fault. As a consequence the
party less at fault escapes entirely, while the party most at fault is
made to bear all the loss. A contribution rule would avoid the all
or nothing approach of indemnity and allow risk allocation to be more
precisely apportioned to fault.
The liberal use of indemnity instead of contribution may also
have a bearing on the policy of insuring adequate compensation of
accident victims. "Since the rule of indemnity shifts the whole burden
of the liability, there is a strong incentive for litigation."6 s Consequently, the practice tends to breed litigation and impede settlement
procedures. It is not clear, however, that making contribution available would correct this. Contribution statutes do not abolish infollow last clear chance than follow the active-passive approach to indemnity.
Austin Elec. Ry. v. Faust, supra, is typical of a line of cases employing the activepassive approach although last clear chance would fit equally as well. Leflar, supra
note 12, at 153.
The last clear chance cases should also be compared with the successive tort
cases in which tortfeasor A, held liable for additional injury caused by the later

negligence of tortfeasor
caused by B. Morrison
auto collisions); Clark
1949) (negligence of

B, is allowed indemnity against B to the extent of damages
v. Madaglia, 287 Mass. 46, 191 N.E. 133 (1934) (successive
v. Halstead, 276 App. Div. 17, 93 N.Y.S.2d 49 (3d Dep't
physicians treating victim's injuries increased plaintiff's

liability to victim); 2 HARPER and JAMES, ToRTs 1124 (1956).

sTJames, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: A Pragmatic Criticism, 54
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1168 (1941).
68N.Y. LAw REvISION COMM'N REP. 39 (1952).
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demnity claims and as long as both the indemnity and contribution
concepts are available in the same jurisdiction, the vague boundary
between the two will continue to breed disputes concerning which
69
concept is applicable.
Furthermore, the practice of invoking indemnity to do the work
of contribution tends to frustrate the policy of best loss distribution.
James argued that contribution is often used by efficient loss distributors against inefficient loss distributors. If, in the absence of a contribution rule, the courts tend to invoke indemnity, all and not just
part of the loss, as under contribution, is allocated to a poor loss
distributor. On these assumptions it can be contended that contribution promotes good loss distribution by reducing the amount of loss
allocated by good to poor loss distributors. The argument must assume, however, that adoption of a contribution rule would reduce
poor loss distribution by way of indemnity more than it would promote poor loss distribution with contribution. I am unable to evaluate
the accuracy of this assumption.
On the whole I think that a decision whether to adopt a contribution rule can properly be made without regard to the practice of using
indemnity to do the work of contribution. No precedents are available to indicate whether the Florida courts would use indemnity this
way. Moreover, the practice gives rise to conflicting implications for
policy in the automobile accident context. Finally, the practice probably affects only a very small part of the total number of joint tortfeasors cases arising out of Florida automobile accidents.
Exceptions
Before a decision to adopt or reject a contribution rule is made
due regard should be given to the classes of cases traditionally considered as "exceptions" to the no-contribution rule. While none of
these theories have furnished the basis for a decision by the Florida
Supreme Court, the broad language of at least one case indicates that
the Court would be quite willing to invoke an exception if convinced
of the merits and given a plausible factual basis to support the
70
theory.
oThe experience of New York and Texas confirms my observation that the
problem of distinguishing cases for indemnity from cases for contribution would
continue to promote litigation although a contribution rule was available.
7OSeaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330,
143 So. 316 (1932). A survey of the principal exceptions to the contribution rule
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One exception to the no-contribution rule may be broadly described as contribution between persons whose liability to the tort
victim rests solely upon respondeat superior.71 Several types of cases
come within this heading. If a judgment is obtained against the members of a partnership because of a tort of a servant of the partnership and one partner pays the judgment, he may have contribution
against the other partners.7 2 Contribution is also allowed between
joint employers held liable on respondeat superior theory for the tort
of a common employee.7 3 Finally, if several creditors through innocent
mistake or ignorance have a sheriff convert the chattels of a third
person by an attachment, a creditor forced to7 4pay the entire claim can
have contribution from the other creditors.
Another exception to the no-contribution rule arises when two or
more tortfeasors neglect the performance of a continuing duty with
which they are jointly charged. In such case a tortfeasor who pays the
entire claim may secure contribution from the other joint tortfeasors.
Thus if two counties are jointly responsible for the upkeep of a
bridge, a county which has been made to pay a claim for negligent
failure to repair the bridge may secure contribution from the other
county.7 5 If adjoining landowners jointly erect a wall which colmight well begin with classes of cases in which indemnity claims are recognized.
Indemnity claims are often referred to as an exception to the no-contribution
rule. This classification seems to me purely a matter of convenience to the writer.
71The exceptions are discussed in 13 ANt. JUR., Contribution §§39-48 (1938),

and RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§99-101 (1937).
72The leading case is Bailey v. Bussing, 28 Conn. 455 (1859). See also

RESTAT -

§99 (1937).
73Hobbs v. Hurley, 117 Me. 449, 104 Atl. 815 (1918); cf. George's Radio, Inc. v.
Capital Transit Co., 75 App. D.C. 187, 126 F.2d 219 (1942). Several writers have
noted the curious inconsistency of the courts' refusing to allow contribution between previously unconnected principals. "Yet no case has been found in which
it is even suggested that separate principals of independently wrongdoing agents
should be subject to contribution the same as joint principals for a single wrongdoing agent, or be treated in any respect otherwise than as personally wrongdoing tortfeasors are treated." Leflar, supra note 12, at 130, 143. Bohlen, supra
note 47, at 562, suggests that the reason for this "apparent anomaly" is that
most torts are committed by servants of corporations, that it is natural to regard
corporations as "in peculiar degree affected by the wrongdoing of their servants,"
and that if the rule were otherwise a corporation could have contribution against
a personal tortfeasor while the latter could not have contribution against a corporation.
MENT, REsTITUTION

74Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill. 261, 21 N.E. 792 (1889); RESTATEMENT,
§101 (1937).
75Armstrong County v. Clarion County, 66 Pa. 218 (1870).
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lapses due to negligent construction and causes injury to a third person,
a landowner required to pay the damage claim may have contribution
against other landowners. 76 Another example of this exception involves officers of a corporation who neglect to file reports required
by statute. If creditors of the corporation force one officer to pay
damages, that officer may be allowed contribution against the others. 77
One other line of cases illustrates the willingness of the courts to
avoid application of the no-contribution rule where good reasons for
doing so exist. Suppose the victim settles with one joint tortfeasor
giving him a covenant not to sue. If the victim then brings suit
against other joint tortfeasors, can defendants introduce evidence of
the consideration received by plaintiff for the covenant not to sue?
One argument used by plaintiffs to exclude such evidence is that to
allow it to reduce defendant's damages would, in effect, allow contribution among joint tortfeasors.78 However, judicial abhorrence
of the prospect of double recovery, plus the persuasive force of the
avoidable consequences rule have more often led the courts to credit
defendant with the consideration paid by settling joint tortfeasors,
without much apparent concern that the no-contribution rule was
being infringed.7 9
Presumably, all of the foregoing exceptions to the no contribution
7GAnkeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887).
77Nickerson v. Wheeler, 118 Mass. 295 (1875).
7STechnically, to credit defendant with consideration received for a covenant
not to sue differs from contribution in that the share of the loss borne by the
settling tortfeasor is set by bargaining between victim and settling tortfeasor;
while contribution rules usually distribute loss according to some fixed percentage.
The practical result of crediting defendant, however, is much the same as obtains
under a contribution rule. In some cases plaintiff has argued that the "collateral source" rule should exclude evidence of the consideration paid for the
covenant not to sue. If there is a basis for holding that the person paying for
the covenant not to sue was not a tortfeasor, Grimm v. Globe Printing Co., 232
S.W. 676 (Mo. 1921), or not a "joint" tortfeasor, the collateral source rule may be
invoked and defendant not credited. Papenfus v. Shell Oil Co., 254 Wis. 233, 35
N.W.2d 920 (1949).
79Aldridge v. Norris, 337 Ill. App. 369, 86 N.E.2d 143 (1949); Greiner v. Hicks,
231 Iowa 141, 300 N.W. 727 (1941). The earlier cases are collected in Annot., 104
A.L.R. 931 (1936). The Florida law is FLA. STAT. §54.28 (2) (1957). If victim sues
A, one joint tortfeasor, to judgment and obtains satisfaction, B, the other joint
tortfeasor, can use the satisfied judgment against A as a bar. But consult the
Rhode Island court's construction of the 1939 UNEFORM ACr §3 as abrogating the
common law principle that complete satisfaction of a judgment releases all other
tortfeasors. Hackett v. Hyson, 72 R.I. 132, 48 A.2d 353 (1946). See also 68 HARv.
L. R v. 685, 695 (1955).
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rule would be recognized by the Florida Supreme Court if a proper
case for their application was presented. On that assumption the
case for a contribution rule is weakened; because whatever justifications for allowing contribution may exist, the availability of these
exceptions will often offer Florida courts a means to allow it. To
this extent, there is no need of a general contribution rule.
Tolerance of Circumvention
Apparent attempts by joint tortfeasors, or those behind them, to
circumvent the rule against contribution have taken two forms. In
one line of cases indemnitors of one joint tortfeasor have claimed the
right of contribution against other joint tortfeasors although the indemnitee had no such right to which indemnitor could be subrogated. 0 The usual holding in this line of cases, that the indemnitor
cannot have contribution against a joint tortfeasor unless the indemnitee would have had such right, appears to foil the ruse.8' But,
except where subrogation to contribution rights are denied altogether, the courts have indicated that if under the circumstances the
indemnitee could have had contribution against his joint tortfeasor
the indemnitor can too; and have perhaps been most willing to hold
that under the circumstances indemnitee could have had contribution.82

In the other line of cases a joint tortfeasor against whom judgment
has been entered has sought to enlist the aid of the policy favoring
free alienability of the rights of judgment creditors.83 Instead of
running the risk that a direct payment to the judgment creditor
would be held to be a satisfaction, some joint tortfeasors have procured a straw man to take an assignment of the judgment creditor's
rights. If this ruse is successful, recovery under the judgment assigned
can approximate the sum available in indemnity proceedings. And
it can be successful because to avoid infringing the policy of free
s0In some of these cases the indemnitor has taken an assignment of the judgment and sought contribution as an assignee-stranger.
SlRoyal Indemnity Co. v. Becker, 122 Ohio St. 582, 173 N.E. 194 (1930); Annots.,
171 A.L.R. 271 (1947); 75 A.L.R. 1486 (1931).

S2Technical grounds can be that the tortfeasors were not "joint," cf. Slater v.
lanni Constr. Co., 268 Mich. 492, 256 N.W. 495 (1934); or that the tortfeasors were
not guilty of equal culpability. Underwriters at Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208
N.W. 13 (1926), and cases cited Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1486, 1488 (1931).
83Annot., 75 A.L.R. 1468, 1471 (1931).
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alienability, the courts must treat each case as presenting a question
of fact:8 4 did assignee act in behalf of a joint tortfeasor when he purchased the assignment or not.8 5 Consequently, a joint tortfeasor who
is fearful that he may have to pay his victim's judgment in full88 has
a fighting chance of avoiding all the loss by the straw man-assignee
device. Large corporate joint tortfeasors with subsidiaries have a
87
situation tailor-made for the straw man-assignee device.
NEW PROBLEMS TO FACE

One other consequence of a rule allowing contribution among
joint tortfeasors remains to be considered. Adoption of a contribution rule surely will spawn a number of new problems that do not
exist in a jurisdiction that honors the no-contribution rule. The
experience of states that have had a contribution rule for an extended period of time foretells the problems to expect.
Would intentional tortfeasors be allowed contribution? If not,
would conduct characterized as "wilful," "wanton," or "gross" be
treated as the equivalent of "intentional" for the purpose of disqualifying a tortfeasor from contribution? The 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act was silent as to these issues: but the
1955 Uniform Act provides that an intentional tortfeasor cannot obtain contribution.8 8 On the other hand, several legal writers advocate

84Gale Lumber Co. v. Bush, 227 Mass. 203, 116 N.E. 480 (1917).
85Evidence that joint tortfeasor supplied the funds for the purchase is critical.
8BThe ethical aspects of the straw-man assignee device are worthy of careful consideration. Apparently a voluntary agreement by all tortfeasors to share the loss,
either before or after the negligent act giving rise to liability, would be enforceable
and not subject to the defense of illegality. REsrATEMENT, REsrrruTioN §102, comment e (1937); RESTATEmENT, CoNTRAars §575 (1932).
87Hunter v. Chicago Lumber & Coal Co., 156 La. 19, 100 So. 35 (1924); Pennsylvania Co. v. West Penn Ry., 110 Ohio St. 516, 144 N.E. 51 (1924). In the latter
case one joint tortfeasor owned 23,192 of 23,363 total shares in the subsidiary that
purchased the judgment. Still the subsidiary was allowed to enforce the judgment.
Of course the corporate veil may be pierced.
881955 UNIFORMi ACr §1 (c). The statute leaves it optional with a jurisdiction
to include or exclude "wilful or wanton" conduct. Some justification for excluding
various types of intentional tortfeasors from contribution appears in the comment
to subsection (c). The first no-contribution case, Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term
Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (1799), denied contribution to intentional tortfeasors. Subsequent English cases so confined it, Reath, Contribution Between
Persons Jointly Charged for Negligence, 12 HARv. L. Rav. 176 (1898), and so did
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extending contribution to intentional tortfeasors.8 9 Consequently, a
cost of adopting a contribution rule is, at the least, the effort expended
by court or legislature in making the necessary study of the intentional
tortfeasor issue. The problem could be left open for judicial decision,
but this would create uncertainty about the Florida Supreme Court's
views which would persist until a case involving the point slowly
made its way to that court.
The statutes of several states allowing contribution provide that
the rendition of a joint judgment is a condition precedent to relief.
Section 211-a of the New York Civil Practice Act is perhaps the
better known example.9 ° If Florida adopted a contribution rule
eventually it would have to decide whether a joint judgment would
be a prerequisite to relief. 91 This question is interrelated with the
rights of a settling tortfeasor to contribution, 9 2 and the desirability of
providing for third party practice. A joint judgment would establish
the existence and the amount of the common liability of which a
contribution claimant must discharge more than his pro rata share.
On the other hand, a joint judgment requirement might discourage
settlement procedures because a tortfeasor who, in good faith, settled
the entire claim of a victim would be barred from contribution.
Further, a third party practice would become impossible. Finally,
the course of action of the tort victim would determine the availability of contribution. It is apparent that the joint judgment issue
is sufficiently knotty to merit very careful study before it is resolved.
The time and effort expended in making such a study would constitute another cost of a contribution rule.
Adoption of a contribution statute would raise important and
difficult questions concerning the application of Florida's Survival
early American cases. After the concept of joint tort was expanded to include
concurrent negligence, however, the no-contribution rule was extended to include

negligent tortfeasors.
89N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 705 (1936);

Gregory, supra note 13, at

366-69; Leflar, supra note 12, at 139-40.
9OSee also Mo. REV. STAT. ANN.

§3658 (1939); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.

2212 (Supp. 1951); W. VA. CODE ANN. §5482 (1949). Advantages and disadvantages
of requiring a joint judgment are set forth in N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N RE'.
706 (1936).
9'See Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 365, 369-72;
Tuft, Contribution Between Joint Tortfeasors, 24 CALIF. L. REV. 546, 552-53 (1936);
N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 706, 726-35 (1936).
92Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16, 85 A.L.R.
1086 (1932).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol11/iss2/2

30

Jones: Contribution Among Tortfeasors
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS
Statute, 93 Wrongful Death Statute,94 Statute of Limitations,95 Work97
96
men's Compensation Act, and Guest Statute.
What would be the effect of the death of a joint tortfeasor? Would
his estate continue to be liable for contribution? Would his estate be
allowed to maintain suit for contribution? Florida has never had to
answer questions such as these. If a contribution rule were adopted,
it might be desirable to amend section 45.11 of the Florida Statutes
to answer the above questions. 98
The 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act expressly
provides that contribution is available in case joint tortfeasors cause
the wrongful death of a third person. 99 Would the Florida Supreme
Court so construe the Wrongful Death Statute, or should a contribution rule be introduced by statute and express provision made for the
case where the victim is wrongfully killed?
Adoption of a contribution rule in Florida would raise several
limitations problems1 0° Would the fact that a cause of action for
contribution is closely connected to a personal injury cause the Florida courts to classify contribution as a tort action, or would the
Florida courts, as have many courts, classify contribution as a quasicontractual action? Actions based on an unjust enrichment theory,
as are quasi-contract, are governed by the three year limitations period
in Florida.1°1 On the other hand, a cause of action for wrongful
death is governed by a two-year limitation, o2 and a cause of action
for negligence is governed by a four year limitation. 0 3 Furthermore,
§45.11 (1957).
941d. §§768.01-.04.
951d. §95.11 (5) (e).
961d. c. 440, especially §440.39.
93FLA. STAT.

97Id. §320.59.
OsIn general, see Dauber, The New Jersey Joint Tortfeasors Contribution Law,

7 Rtrrmats L. RFv. 380, 888-89 (1953).
991955 UNIFORM Acr §1 (a).

lOOSee Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E.2d 786, 149 A.L.R.
1183 (1943); Ainsworth v. Berg, 253 Wis. 438, 34 N.W.2d 790, modified on rehearing, 253 Wis. 445a, 85 N.W.2d 911 (1948); Dauber, supra note 98, at 892-98;
Larson, A Problem in Contribution: The Tortfeasor with an Individual Defense

Against the Injured Party, 1940 Wis. L. REv. 467, 480-483; 67 H~Av. L. REv. 896
(1954).
1S0FLA. STAT. §95.11(5)(e) (1957); Stranahan, Harris & Co. v. Hillsborough
County, 154 Fla. 658, 18 So.2d 789 (1944); Ball v. Roney, 112 Fla. 186, 150 So.

240 (1988).

§768.04 (1957).
i03Warner v. Ware, 186 Fla. 466, 182 So. 605 (1988) (holding that §95.11 (4) is

102FLA. STAT.
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when would a cause of action for contribution "accrue"?104 Finally,
suppose a shorter limitations period is applicable for victim's suit
against joint tortfeasor A than for suit against joint tortfeasor B, and
that the shorter period has run. If victim obtains judgment against
B, would A also be protected against a contribution suit by B?10 5 The
foregoing and other limitations issues would ultimately have to be
resolved if Florida adopted a contribution rule.
Section 440.11, Florida Statutes (1957), provides that the liability
of an employer to pay a compensation award after electing to come
within chapter 440 shall be exclusive and "in place of all other liability of such employer to the employee, his legal representative,
husband or wife, parents, dependents, next of kin, and anyone otherwise entitled to recover damages from such employer at law or in
admiralty on account of such injury or death .... ." Section 440.39
provides that if the employee's injury or death is wrongfully caused
by a third party the employee or his dependents pursue their common
law remedy against the third party. If the employee accepts compensation, employer becomes subrogated, in part, to employee's cause of
action against the tortfeasor. 1° 6
If an injured Florida employee sues a third party tortfeasor for
negligence and the evidence shows the employer sufficiently at fault
to support a claim by third party against employer for contribution,107
would the exclusive liability clause of the Workmen's Compensation
Act bar a contribution claim by third party against the employer?
To allow the contribution claim would allow, in effect, an action
against the employer. But to deny the contribution claim would force
applicable). But compare a malpractice suit, Slaughter v. Tyler, 126 Fla. 515, 171
So. 320 (1936) (holding that FLA. STAT. §95.11 (5)(e) (1935) and a 3-year period
apply).
1041955 UNIFORM AcT §3 (c),(d), Comm'rs Note.
10567 HARV. L. REv. 896 (1954) (commenting on Littlewood v. George Wimpey
9: Co., 2 All E.R. 915 (C.A. 1953), holding that contribution would be barred).
Compare Godfrey v. Tidewater Power Co., 223 N.C. 647, 27 S.E.2d 736 (1943);
Annot., 149 A.L.R. 1186 (1944).
lo6Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Bedingfield, 60 So.2d 489 (Fla. 1952); Note, 4 U. FLA. L.
REv. 390 (1951).
lO7Or for indemnity. The indemnity issue can arise now. The cases in other
jurisdictions on the latter issue have reached opposite results. See Note, 42 VA. L.
REV. 959 (1956). Comparable issues have been raised under the Longshoremen's
and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 44 STAT. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §§901-50
(1952). Weyerhauser S.S. Co. v. Nacirema Operating Co., 78 Sup. Ct. 438 (1958);
Ryan Stevedoring Co. v. Pan-Atlantic S.S. Corp., 350 U.S. 124 (1956); Weinstock,
Employer's Duty to Indemnify Shipowners, 103 U. PA. L. REv. 321 (1954).
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third party to pay all damages although under a contribution rule
he would normally have to pay only his pro rata share. The question
would be further complicated in cases where employee had accepted
compensation and the employer had become subrogated to the extent of his payments to employee's cause of action against the third
party.108 Here, again, a very careful study of the question of the
availability of a contribution claim by third parties against employers
covered by the Workmen's Compensation Act would become a necessity, sooner or later, if a contribution rule were adopted in Florida.
The Florida Guest Statute' 09 requires a showing of more than
ordinary negligence before a guest can recover from his host. Suppose
a guest is injured by the concurrent negligence of host and a third
party. If guest proceeds to judgment and satisfaction against the
third party, would the third party be allowed contribution (if it were
in effect) from the host? Must host driver be guilty of more than
ordinary negligence before a contribution claim against him would
lie?1 0 This is another problem that would be created by the adoption
of a contribution rule in Florida.
Assuming the adoption of a contribution rule in Florida, what
would be the ratio of contribution among the joint tortfeasors?"',
Would contribution be based on the degree of fault of each tortfeasor,
comparative culpability,112 or would contribution be based on a conception of numerical equality, that is, total damages divided by the
number of tortfeasors?" 3 Assuming that contribution would be based
on a conception of numerical equality, if there were more than two
joint tortfeasors and one is insolvent or leaves the jurisdiction, would
108A recent New Jersey case held the employer immune from contribution.
Farren v. New Jersey Turnpike Authority, 31 N.J. Super. 356, 106 A.2d 752 (App.
Div. 1954). See also Bertone v. Turco Products, 252 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1958). Apparently this is the usual holding. But see Maio v. Faks, 339 Pa. 180, 14 A.2d 105
(1940); compare Brown v. Southern Ry., 204 N.C. 668, 169 S.E. 419 (1933) (allowing third party to use contributory negligence by employer as a bar to employer's subrogation claim).
109FLA. STAT. §320.59 (1957).
110Patterson v. Tomlinson, 118 S.W.2d 645 (Tex. Civ. App. 1938); Walker v.
Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934).
'11See Dauber, supra note 98, at 282-84; Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 1938 Wis. L. RIv. 365, 372-75; Tuft, supra note 91, at 550; Annot., 122
A.L.R. 520, 525 (1939); 1955 UNiFORM AcT §§1 (b), 2.
112Ark., Del., Hawaii, and S.D. apply the comparative culpability rule when
apportioning damages for contribution. 9 U.L.A. 17 (Supp. 1597).
1"The numerical equality conception as a basis for apportioning damages for
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the "equity rule"114 apply? If the equity rule applied would paying
tortfeasors continue to have a cause of action against absent or insolvent tortfeasors?
Another problem that would surely arise if Florida were to adopt
a contribution rule involves the tortfeasor with an individual defense
or personal immunity.15 The question of the liability for contribution of a tortfeasor for whom the statute of limitations has run
against the injured person's claim has been discussed, as has the
liability for contribution of an an employer covered by the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The liability of a tortfeasor who has purchased
a covenant not to sue from the injured party to contribute to other
joint tortfeasors will be given separate treatment below.
Suppose that P is injured as a result of the concurring negligence
of X and Y, that X is the spouse of P, or a filial relation exists between X and P, or a family relationship. In Florida X has a defense
against an action by P. But suppose P proceeds to judgment and satisfaction against Y: can Y now obtain contribution from X? In a number of husband and wife type cases the courts have held that contribution could not be had from a spouse if the spouse had a defense
against an action by the injured person. 1 6 The merits of cases of this
type are far from free of doubt. Careful study of the personal immunity-individual defense problem should precede adoption of a
contribution rule.
Several different problems involving settlements would arise if
Florida adopted a contribution rule. Whether a contribution rule is
in effect or not an injured person has to be careful that in settling
with one joint tortfeasor, the others are not also discharged under
the rule that a release of one joint tortfeasor releases all. Both the
1939 and the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Acts
provide that a release of one joint tortfeasor does not release the
contribution is much more prevalent. The 1955 UNIFORM Acr §§1 (b), 2 adopts it.
'l4Whereby each contributor is liable also for a portion of the pro rata share
of insolvent or absent tortfeasors.
"15 See Larson, supra note 100, at 467; Tuft, supra note 91, at 551; Annot., 19

A. L. R.2d 1003 (1951).
116See Kennedy v. Camp, 14 N.J. 390, 102 A.2d 595 (1954); see also 42 GEo. L.J.
560 (1954), 8 RuTcERs L. REv. 552 (1954), both of which criticize the holding in
the Kennedy case that contribution was not available. An example of the filial relationship is Zutter v. O'Connell, 200 Wis. 601, 229 N.W. 74 (1930). See also
Walker v. Kroger Grocery & Baking Co., 214 Wis. 519, 252 N.W. 721 (1934) (joint
tortfeasor host driver had an assumption of the risk defense against injured guest).
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others "unless its terms so provide."' 117 In Florida, since 1957, a release or covenant not to sue "as to one tortfeasor" does not discharge
other tortfeasors.1s Apparently, then, the danger to injured persons
that a settlement with one joint tortfeasor releases all has been
minimized.
Would a joint tortfeasor who in good faith settled the injured
person's entire claim be allowed contribution against other joint
tortfeasors who did not participate or consent to the settlement?19

The cases in other jurisdictions have tended to allow a settling tortfeasor to obtain contribution if the injured party also released other
tortfeasors and the settlement was in good faith.- 0 Such holdings
appear to promote the policy favoring settlements and the clearing
of over-burdened court calendars. Exactly what are the elements of
a prima facie case for contribution for settling tortfeasors, however, is
still subject to some disagreement. For example the cases are in conflict on the issue of whether settling torifeasor must prove that the
sum paid in settlement was reasonable121
But what of the right of a tortfeasor who effects only a partial
settlement or satisfaction of a judgment against him? Because other
joint tortfeasors are not discharged by a partial settlement both the
1939 and 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act deny
contribution to the settling tortfeasor. As long as the liability of
non-settling tortfeasors to the injured party is unliquidated and undetermined a good case against contribution in favor of a partially
settling tortfeasor can be made.222 The case against contribution is
1171955 UNFoRM Aar §4 (a); 1939 UNEFoni ACr §4.
118FLA. STAT. §54.28 (1957).
11DOn this issue see Gregory, ContributionAmong Tortfeasors, 1938 Wis. L. Rv.
365, 391; Note, 68 HARv. L. Rav. 697 (1955); N.Y. LAw REvIsION COMM'N REP.
740-43 (1936). The 1939 UNroFm Aar §2 (3) provides: "A joint tortfeasor who
enters into a settlement with the injured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor whose liability to the injured person is not
extinguished by the settlementC' See also 1955 UNIFORm Acr §1 (d).
120Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, 245 Ky. 631, 54 S.W.2d 16, 85 A.L.R. 1086
(1932), is representative. O'Keefe v. Baltimore Transit Co., 201 Md. 345, 94 A.2d
26 (1953), held that settling tortfeasor need not notify other tortfeasors although
the injured party had filed suit against all. Where statutes require a joint judgment as a condition precedent to contribution these holdings are not possible.
llCompare Consolidated Coach Corp. v. Burge, supra note 120, with Western
Cas. S. Surety Co. v. Milwaukee Gen. Constr. Co., 213 Wis. 302, 251 N.W. 491 (1933).
122See Lacewell v. Griffin, 214 Ark. 909, 219 S.W.2d 227 (1949); N.Y. LAW
REVisION COMM'N REP. 741 (1936).
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not so clear once the liability of non-settling tortfeasors has become
determined and liquidated. Whether partial satisfaction of a judgment can support a contribution claim should reflect holdings on
whether in a later suit by the injured person against non-settling tort123
feasors the judgment settles the maximum amount of recovery.
Would a joint tortfeasor who has paid part of the injured party's
claim and taken a covenant not to sue be liable for contribution if a
12 4
judgment was later rendered against the other joint tortfeasors?
To answer this question yes is to diminish incentive for settlement;
to answer it no is to run the risk of collusion between the settling
tortfeasor and the injured person. Section 5 of the 1939 Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act attempted to balance the competing policies of promoting settlements and discouraging collusion
by providing that a settling tortfeasor did not secure immunity from
contribution unless the release was given before a right to contribution
accrued; and unless it contained an express provision that the injured
person's claim against non-settling tortfeasors was reduced to the
extent of the released tortfeasor's pro rata share of the common liability.125 Apparently Section 5 was not effective in preventing collusion, but it did discourage settlements by one tortfeasor. Attorneys
for the injured person were reluctant to accept a release giving up
the injured party's pro rata share of the common liability because
they had no way of knowing what they were giving up. Tortfeasors,
on the other hand, did not want to settle unless they could secure immunity from contribution. To meet these objectives Section 4 (b) of
the 1955 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act provides that
a release in good faith "discharges the tortfeasor to whom it is given
from all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor."126
In states that do not have a statutory provision covering the
matter, the tendency has been to hold that the released tortfeasor
continues to be liable to make contribution.127 Of course a settling
123N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM'N REP. 742-43 (1936).
12 1
1n general, see Dauber, supra note 98, at 386; Larson, supra note 100, at
467; Notes, 68 HARV. L. REV. 697, 704 (1955); 1950 Wis. L. REV. 684; Annot. 8
A.L.R.2d 196 (1949); 1939 UNIFORM AcT §§4, 5; 1955 UNIFORM AcT §4; N.Y. LAW
REVISION COMM'N REP. 707-08, 743-45 (1936).
125In the absence of such a provision in the release the injured person's claim
against non-settling tortfeasors is usually reduced only to the extent of the consideration received by the injured person. FLA. STAT. §54.28(2) (1957) expressly
so provides.
1261955 UNIFORM ACr §4 (b), Comm'rs Note.
l27Employers Mut. Cas. Co. v. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 235 Minn. 304,
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tortfeasor can often protect himself against the ill effects of a holding
that he continues liable for contribution. For example, the tortfeasor may insist upon a "save harmless" clause in the settlement with
injured party; and/or extract a promise from the injured person to
satisfy to the extent of tortfeasors' pro rata share any judgment ob128
tained against other tortfeasors.
Adoption of a contribution rule in Florida would raise new problems in insurance law. Would an insurance company paying a claim
against insured joint tortfeasor be subrogated to insured's claim for
contribution against other joint tortfeasors?129 The decisions on the
point in other states were sufficiently in conflict to cause an express
provision allowing subrogation to be inserted in the 1955 Uniform
30
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act.
Does a joint tortfeasor's liability insurance policy include the risk
of a contribution claim against the insured so that the insurance
company is liable therefor? More specifically, would the standard
coverage clauses by which insurance companies assume to pay any
liability imposed upon the insured for damages because of bodily
injury caused by accident and arising out of the ownership or use of
the automobile impose upon insurance companies in Florida a duty to
pay contribution claims against insured?" 3' The wording of the in50 N.W.2d 689 (1951); Blauvelt v. Village of Nyack, 141 Misc. 730, 252 N.Y. Supp.
746 (Sup. Ct. 1981); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 264
Wis. 493, 59 N.W.2d 425 (1958). See also McKenna v. Austin, 77 App. D.C. 228,
134 F.2d 659 (1948); Annot., 8 A.L.R.2d 196 (1949).
12BApparently this is the practice of insurance companies in Wisconsin. Notes,
68 HAIRv. L. REv. 697, 704 (1955); 1950 Wis. L. REv. 684, 686. Similar instruments
are set forth in Robertson v. Trammel, 83 S.W. 258, 260 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904);
and in Baylor Univ. v. Bradshaw, 52 S.W.2d 1094, 1095 (Tex. Civ. App. 1932).
%29See 1955 UNxFoam ACr §I (e); 8 APPELMAN, INSURANCE §4933 (1942); N.Y.
LAw REVIsION COMM'N REP. 203 (1945).
230§1 (e). The Commissioner's note indicates that Minnesota, Underwriters at
Lloyds v. Smith, 166 Minn. 388, 208 N.W. 13 (1926), and Wisconsin, Frankfort
Gen. Ins. Co. v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 169 Wis. 533, 173 N.W. 307 (1919),
have subrogated the insurer; while North Carolina refused to subrogate. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 211 N.C. 13, 188
S.E. 634 (1936). New York also subrogates. Travelers Ins. Co. v. McLane, 240 App.
Div. 939, 267 N.Y. Supp. 784 (4th Dep't 1933). See also PRossm, TORTS 248, n.65
(2d ed. 1955).
I'See Dauber, supra note 98, at 390-91. Wisconsin has held insurance companies
liable for contribution. Forecki v. Kohlberg, 237 Wis. 67, 295 N.W. 7 (1941); 8
APPELMAN, INSURANCE §4913 (1942). The N.Y. LAW REvisION COMM'N REP. 201-04
(1945) indicated that an insurer would "probably . . . not" be liable.
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surance policy may control the issue. In Fuller v. Fullera2 a provision of the policy provided: "This policy does not apply . . . (d)
under Coverage A (standard bodily injury coverage clause), to bodily
injury to or death of any employee of the insured . . . or to the insured or any member of the family of the insured residing in the same
household as the insured." The injured parties, wife and child, obtained a joint and several judgment against husband and railroad
company. Railroad company paid the judgment and issued attachment executions against the husband, naming his insurer as garnishee.
On appeal it was held that the quoted exclusion clause did not allow
recovery against garnishee.
From the standpoint of policy it may be desirable to deny insurance companies the right to become subrogated to their insured's
contribution claims. Since the premium paid to the company is
presumably full consideration for the risk of liability, subrogation
would be a windfall to the company and would often allow allocation of part of the risk to a poor loss distributor. The savings, if any,
on premiums paid by policyholders if subrogation were permitted is
probably inconsequential.
On the other hand, from the standpoint of policy it seems desirable to seek to hold insurance companies liable to make contribution. Good loss distribution results from such a holding.
A number of procedural problems would be presented by the
adoption of a contribution rule in Florida.133 A decision would have
to be made whether contribution claims would be confined to a
separate action or litigated in the injured party's action. If litigation
of contribution issues were permitted in the injured party's action,
would a defendant have to make his contribution claim then? If the
injured party were to join only one joint tortfeasor would the defendant be allowed to bring in other joint tortfeasors as third party
defendants?134 Would a contribution claimant always have to show
Pa. 219, 110 A.2d 175 (1955); 60 DICK. L. REv. 286 (1956).
133On the procedural phases of contribution see Gregory, LEGISLATIVE Loss
DISTRIBUTION IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONS (1936); Procedural Aspects of Securing Tort
Contribution in the Injured Plaintiffs Action, 47 HARV. L. Rlv. 209 (1933); Tort
Contribution Practice in New York, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 269 (1935); Tuft, supra note
91, at 702. The statute of limitations problem was discussed, supra p. 205, as was
the joint judgment issue, supra p. 204.
134Florida does not permit third party practice. Florida Fuel Oil v. Spring Villas,
Inc., 95 So.2d 581 (Fla. 1957); Pan American Surety Co. v. Jefferson Constr. Co., 99
So.2d 726 (3d D.C.A. Fla. 1958).
132380
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that he had paid more than his pro rata share of common liability?
If so, trial of plaintiff's and defendant's claims together would not be
possible unless litigation of contingent claims became possible. Moreover, a new kind of judgment would have to be rendered on a successful contribution claim tried in the injured party's action because
a claimant who has not discharged his liability to the injured party
would not be entitled to an executable judgment for contribution.235
Further, the successful contribution claimant might want to appeal
the judgment against him in the plaintiff's favor. And suppose on
appeal that plaintiff's judgment against the successful contribution
claimant is affirmed but the contingent judgment for the contribution
claimant is reversed and a new trial ordered. Would plaintiff then be
able to execute his judgment? It is obvious that a snakepit of procedural issues would be raised by the adoption of a contribution
38
rule.
CONCLUSION

As the law of Florida now stands the way is open to adopt contribution either by statute or by decision. Although there is a general
consensus among members of The Florida Bar that contribution is
not available between joint tortfeasors, the only support in
the cases for this assumption are dicta. 137 In Seaboard Air Line Ry.
lS5The practice in Wisconsin is to allow the successful contribution claimant
to take a "contingent judgment." Walt v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926).
The contingency is that judgment creditor pay more than his pro rata share of
the judgment in favor of the injured party.
lsA model statute resolving the procedural issues described in the text is set
forth in GREGORY, LEislATIvE Loss IN NEGLIGENCE ACTIONs 44-45 (1936). The
model statute is discussed in Gregory, Tort Contribution Practice in New York, 20
CoRNEL L.Q. 269, 278 (1935). I have by no means exhausted the issues that a
contribution rule would breed. E.g., conflicts of laws, Dauber, supra note 98, at
393; bankruptcy, Dauber, supra note 98, at 389; and res judicata, 1955 UNIFORM
Acr §3 (), problems would appear.
lasThe consensus of the bar is probably based on the following language of
Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 332, 143
So. 316 (1932); "Generally, one of two joint tortfeasors cannot have contribution
from the other. But there are exceptions to this rule, one of which is in that class
of cases where although both parties are at fault and both liable to the person
injured such as an employee of one of them, yet they are not in pari delicto as to
each other, as where the injury has resulted from a violation of the duty which
one owes the other, so that as between themselves, the act or omission of the
one from whom indemnity is sought is the primary cause of the injury."
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Co. v. American District Electric Protective Co. 1 38 the railroad's decla-

ration asked full recovery for the damages it had been forced to pay
an injured employee. Plaintiff's claim thus was for indemnity, which
shifts all the loss; and not for contribution, which shifts only part
of the loss. The decision does show that Florida will grant indemnity
to a joint tortfeasor under some circumstances. a39 The way is open,
then, for the Florida Supreme Court to hold that contribution is
40
available among joint tortfeasors guilty only of negligence.
For the reasons set forth below I recommend that Florida not
adopt a contribution rule.
With the possible exception of cases of intentional torts, I would
give little weight to traditional conceptions of fault in dealing with
the contribution problem. The context in which contribution problems most often arise in Florida is the traffic accident field. The typical
joint tort arising from automobile accident involves only concurrently
negligent behavior. I do not believe that a court sacrifices its dignity
when it lends its aid to a negligent automobile driver. So far as I
can tell the extension of indemnity to negligent drivers under cover
of the active-passive dichotomy has not detracted from the dignity
of the courts. Nor do I believe that it is morally reprehensible to aid a
negligent driver. In the typical negligence case arising out of automobile accidents moral guilt is rare. Further, the development of so
many exceptions to the no-contribution rule suggests that the courts
themselves do not give much weight to the notion that it is morally
bad to aid a negligent tortfeasor. To the contrary, development of
the last clear chance doctrine, passage of a comparative negligence
l3SNote 137 supra. See also Crenshaw Bros. Produce Co. v. Harper, 142 Fla. 27,
194 So. 353 (1940); American Dist. Elec. Protective Co. v. Seaboard Air Line Ry.,
139 Fla. 451, 190 So. 820 (1939); American Dist. Elec. Protective Co. v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 129 Fla. 518, 177 So. 294 (1937). In Wolfe Constr. Co. v. Ellison, 127
Fla. 808, 174 So. 594 (1937), the no-contribution rule was used to justify a holding
that an alleged joint tortfeasor found guilty by the jury could not challenge a
judgment rendered on a finding by the jury that another alleged joint tortfeasor
was not guilty.
13
9See also Suwannee Valley Elec. Cooperative, Inc. v. Live Oak, P. & G. R.R.,
73 So.2d 820 (Fla. 1954), in which indemnity was allowed a joint tortfeasor found
not to be in pari delicto.
14oThe judiciaries of several jurisdictions have adopted a contribution rule
without the aid of statute. The District of Columbia, Minnesota, Pennsylvania
(before the statute), Tennessee, and Wisconsin (before the statute) are so listed
in 9 U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 1956). Twenty-two other jurisdictions have contribution
statutes.
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statute governing suits against railroads, 141 and the practice in many
other cases of extending the aid of the courts to parties technically
at fault indicates that moral evaluations have undergone a change.
A new ethical conception is making its way to general acceptance and
is replacing the kind of right and wrong conceptions that sustain the
in pari delicto doctrine. This new ethic holds it is both just - because
humane - and efficient - because wise policy - to adapt the laws and
practices of the courts so as to minimize the losses automobile accidents produce, fairly compensate the victims of accidents that cannot
142
be prevented, and spread the loss over all or a large part of society.
I do not believe that a refined conception of fault requires that
a contribution rule be adopted. Almost always contribution is granted
on a ratio based on numerical equality. Under such practice contribution is not necessarily related to degree of fault. Of course contribution could be based on comparative fault. This would require,
however, not only that the fault of tortfeasors be compared, but that
the courts assume the often difficult administrative burden of appor1 43
tioning damages.
Furthermore, even a refined conception of fault seems out of place
in the automobile accident context. A high percentage of the claims
arising from traffic mishaps are asserted against defendants who are
not at fault in any way, but only vicariously liable. The operation
of Florida's dangerous instrumentality doctrine, which makes the vicarious liability of the owner of the car a virtual cinch, plus the effect
of the Financial Responsibility Laws, insure that in most cases the
parties ultimately paying the damages, at least to the extent of policy
coverage, are insurance companies who are free of fault. Even a refined conception of fault offers no solution to the issue whether one
insurance company, free of fault, should bear all the loss or be allowed
to allocate part of it via contribution to another insurance company
141Fro. STAT. §768.06 (1957).
242"[M]achinery began enormously to multiply the hazards of work and life;
at the same time production and distribution came to be conducted predominantly
by organized groups, the expansion of markets made possible low unit overhead
costs, and we acquired more experience in the business of insurance. Gradually,
we concluded it was not only unfair but inefficient to make injured individuals
bear losses casually related to our new scale of economic operations when these
losses might readily and painlessly be spread among those who benefitted by the
operations." HuRsT, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM 105 (1956).
1a-The doctrines of indemnity, last clear chance, and contributory negligence
show a willingness of the courts to compare fault. But these doctrines do not
require damages to be apportioned. Note, 45 HARV. L. Rxv. 349, 354 (1930).
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also free of fault. Thus, even a contribution rule based on comparative fault would not in practice insure a risk allocation in accordance
with degree of fault, except in the very few cases and to the extent
that a joint tortfeasor was not insured and was not acting as the representative of another.
The insurance industry has been notably lacking in enthusiasm for
a contribution rule. Apparently the same is true of large self-insurers.
That contribution could implement a refined conception of fault does
not seem important to these, the usual defendants in tort suits. Practically, defendants of these classes can and often do secure contribution
without a contribution rule by voluntary agreement to share the
damages burden. If an agreement to share damages cannot be reached,
the tendency for contribution claims to cancel out may minimize the
importance of the lack of a contribution rule. Finally, assuming some
companies have to bear a larger burden than they would under a
contribution rule, the incidence of the additional burden, if it is
large enough to require an adjustment of rates, may be passed on to
policyholders by means of premiums charged.
I have no basis for believing that adoption of a contribution rule
would minimize collusion between injured persons and one tortfeasor.
To the contrary, reports to the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
"appear to agree that it (Section 5 of the 1939 Uniform Contribution
Act) has accomplished nothing in preventing collusion.."'1 4

I assume,

therefore, that the collusion problem will not differ sufficiently under
contribution to influence the merits of the contribution problem.
I believe that a contribution rule has little constructive to offer
the cause of accident prevention. Most claims arising from traffic
mishaps are based on negligence. Even assuming that the driving
public would know of the contribution risk if a contribution rule were
adopted, I doubt that careless driving would be deterred. The fear
of serious physical injury, large damage awards, and death has not
deterred many drivers from carelessness. The additional risk of a
contribution claim likewise would probably have little or no effect on
such drivers. Moreover, modern accident prevention studies emphasize
that factors quite unrelated to the chance of legal liability are the
5
chief causes of accidents.14
Adoption of a contribution rule would increase the litigation burden of Florida courts. If it is assumed that contribution would dis1441955 UNIFORM Aar §4 (b), Comm'rs Note.
145The literature of accident prevention is summarized in 2 HARPER and JAMES,
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courage settlements, and the experience under the 1989 Uniform Contribution Act verifies the assumption146-then suits by injured persons
would be increased. Suits by injured persons would in turn be augmented by claims for contribution. The burden of contribution claims
could be minimized by adequate third party practice provisions. However, such provisions would deprive the injured party of control over
the parties to the lawsuit. The consequence would be discouraging
to the policy of providing adequate compensation of accident victims.
Support for the contention that contribution better conforms to
popular conceptions of fairness and is more comprehensible to laymen
is far from convincing. About half of the states still do not have a
contribution rule of any form.147 Further, the weight of the popularity
of contribution factor is reduced to the extent that popularity rests
upon vague notions of equality.
Unless a tortfeasor who purchases a partial release or a covenant
not to sue is protected against contribution claims by his joint tortfeasors, part of tortfeasor's incentive to settle will be diminished. On
the other hand, if protection of a settling tortfeasor against contribution can be granted only if the injured party agrees to reduce his
damage claim against other joint tortfeasors to the extent of the pro
rata share of the released tortfeasor, the incentive of the injured party
to settle will be diminished.148 Accordingly, in order not to diminish
incentives for settlement and thus confound proper compensation of
injured parties, it is desirable that a contribution rule be accompanied
by a rule that a separate, good faith settlement will protect a settling
tortfeasor against contribution claims. 149 Even if a tortfeasor often
can secure a very cheap settlement, and conceding that he might react
to such an opportunity by delaying settlement until trial, bringing
other tortfeasors into the settlement, by not settling at all, or by
settling and running the risk of contribution, the need to compensate
victims would still require that a tortfeasor obtaining a good faith
settlement be protected against contribution proceedings. Because if
his response to a cheap settlement opportunity is to not settle at all,
or to delay settlement, prompt and proper compensation of injured
parties will not be obtained. The possibility of reducing incentives
to settle, or of delaying settlements is reason enough to justify refusal
TORTS §§11.4, 12.4 (1956).
1461955 UNIFORM AcT, Comm'rs Note §4 (b).
1471955 UNIFORM AcT, Comm'rs Prefatory Note.
2481939 UNIFORm Acr §5.
1491955 UNIFORM ACr §4.
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to adopt a contribution rule which does not also protect a tortfeasor
settling in good faith from contribution proceedings.
Contribution would often deprive injured parties of the tactical
advantage of playing tortfeasors off against each other, thereby discouraging settlements. If contribution includes a third party practice
provision, injured parties will lose control over the parties to the
suits and this may be reflected in the damage award.
Contribution may often be used to allocate part of the loss produced by an accident from good loss distributors to poor loss distributors. On the other hand, contribution may seldom be used to
allocate loss from poor loss distributors to good loss distributors.
Subrogation of insurance carriers to the contribution claims of
their insureds, if contribution were adopted, is not likely to be reflected in premium rates unless carriers are also freed from contribution claims against their insureds. The lack of support for a contribution rule by the insurance industry may indicate that they expect
little advantage from contribution.
A flexible court, fully aware of the potentialities of the indemnity
device, can often extend complete relief to a party whom the court
believes has a meritorious contribution claim. The Florida Supreme
Court has no precedents which would interfere with a flexible use of
indemnity in joint tortfeasor cases.
Florida has no precedents which would preclude it from allowing
contribution in the name of the several exceptions the common law
developed to the no contribution rule. Availability of these conceptions reduces the need for a general contribution rule, even if the
need for a contribution rule were to be assumed.
Joint tortfeasors may be able to circumvent the rule against contribution by the use of a straw-man assignment.5 0 The claim of an indemnitor of a joint tortfeasor for subrogation may induce the court
to find that contribution can be granted.
Finally, if adoption of a contribution rule included a procedure
whereby contribution could be obtained in the injured party's action,
the issues that would be raised at the trial would become so complicated that a comparative negligence statute would become undesirable.151
In fine, it would be unwise for Florida by statute or by decision
to adopt a contribution rule.
1501 pass no judgment on any question of ethics that may be invobed.

15aSee note 17 supra.
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